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Potential failure mode analysis
Geohazards must be considered, assessed and mitigated for all life-
cycle phases of most mega infrastructure projects. This paper presents a
unique mega engineering project, the 600 MW Kárahnjúkar
Hydropower Project in Iceland. The construction site presented several
interesting and complex geological and geophysical conditions, such as
an unexpected discovery of an active fault in the foundation of the main
dam (mega dam) and earthquake activity in a nearby volcanic zone
caused by a subsurface volcanic intrusion during the first impound-
ment. The related apprehensions included predictions of: Persistent
movements and opening of faults in the dam foundation causing ex-
cessive leakage, large reservoir induced crustal deformation that could
trigger volcanic eruption or near field earthquake action such as re-
servoir triggered earthquakes that might affect the safety of the dam
structures. The approach taken to resolve these apprehensions was to
undertake specific investigations, assessments and monitoring, through
a novel multidisciplinary organization. The focus of the paper is on
describing the development and implementation of a holistic multi-
source geohazard monitoring program for the main reservoir, Hálslón
Reservoir and its dams. The discussion starts with a definition of what
constitutes monitoring of geohazards within the framework of the
project. This is followed by an outline of the monitoring networks im-
plemented comprising instruments monitoring seismicity (micro-
seismic stations and strong-motion instrumentation), crustal move-
ments (continuous global positioning systems and benchmarks), fault
movement (extensometers, joint and crack meters), groundwater ele-
vation and leakage. Finally, a summary of key results from the
geohazard monitoring is given. The geological challenges and related
apprehensions are linked to the relevant research and investigations
carried out, the monitoring networks installed, and the results pro-
duced, which demonstrate that during and after the first impoundment
the key monitored processes were all within the pre-set limits. The case
presented is relevant for current and future mega engineering projects
as it demonstrates that a monitoring program set up to guard opera-
tional safety in the spirit of potential failure mode analysis, will provide
important information on geo-environmental impact of a mega en-
gineering project, not only for scientific interest but also for public
information.
1. Introduction
In planning and implementing a hydropower project involving re-
servoir impounding, geohazards must be considered, assessed and mi-
tigated for all the project's life-cycle phases. Herein geohazards in a
hydropower project perspective follow the classification of
Sigtryggsdóttir et al. (2015) and refer to hazardous events arising from
geological, as well as hydrological conditions, both local and regional.
The presence of criticalities in a reservoir's dam foundation such as
faults are an example of local geohazard, while regional geohazards
include for example earthquakes and volcanism. The danger arising
from geohazards poses a threat to the safety of a reservoir and its dams.
This is evident from the numerous incidents reported on in the litera-
ture (Lin et al., 2014; Wieland, 2009; Stapledon, 1976; Nonveiller,
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1987). Additionally, one geohazard may trigger or be interrelated to
another (Sigtryggsdóttir et al., 2016; Wei et al., 2018). Furthermore, the
impounding and operation of a reservoir may contribute to the trig-
gering of geohazard related events, e.g. reservoir triggered earthquakes
(RTE) (Lomnitz, 1974; Lane, 1974; Meade, 1991; ICOLD (International
Commission on Large Dams), 2011; Rajendran et al., 2013) and land-
slides (Schuster, 1979; Wang et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2006; Song et al.,
2018) that further may induce impulse wave on the reservoir (Ibañez
and Hatzor, 2018). The potential hazardous consequences of such
geohazard triggering are intensified in the case of a mega dam retaining
the reservoir.
Monitoring of important geological features comprising a possible
geohazard or relevant processes is thus of vital importance in guarding
overall safety and reliability of a reservoir and its dams. In addition,
monitoring of one geohazard may provide information on the devel-
opment of another (Sigtryggsdóttir et al., 2016). The literature includes
reports on monitoring programs in conjunction with actual reservoirs
and dams that mainly focus on observing one or two specific geoha-
zards. This includes: the seismic monitoring in relation with RTE's of
the Koyna and Warna reservoir site in India (Gupta and Combs, 1976;
Yadav et al., 2013) as well as near the Osmansagar reservoir (Rastogi
et al., 1986); seismic monitoring and groundwater measurements in
relation to the seismicity of the Koyna region (Gupta, 2001); monitoring
of crustal movements and seismicity (Abdel-Monem et al., 2012) in the
Aswan region (Lake Nasser), Egypt; monitoring of an ancient landslide
reactivated by the impounding of the Geheyan reservoir, China (Qi
et al., 2006), and the monitoring of a landslide in the Aosta Valley,
Italy, impinging on a concrete arch gravity dam (Barla et al., 2010).
However, it is difficult to find in the literature a case study that
reports on the development and implementation of a multi-disciplinary
organization of a holistic geohazard monitoring program for reservoirs
and dams. In this paper such an account will be given on the case of the
Hálslón Reservoir in Iceland. The importance of such schemes for
overall reservoir and dam safety is demonstrated for the general case by
Sigtryggsdóttir et al. (2016) in a quantitative analysis of interrelations
in a multi-source geohazard monitoring using a conceptual model
(Sigtryggsdóttir and Snæbjörnsson, 2019).
The objective of this paper is to give a holistic account of the
challenges encountered related to geohazards in the Hálslon region and
how they were evaluated and resolved through investigations, assess-
ment and monitoring using an organized multidisciplinary approach.
The paper presents the geohazard investigation, assessment and
monitoring for the Hálslón Reservoir of 2100 million m3 and 57 km2,
the main storage for the 690 MW Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project
(KHP) in Iceland (Figs. 1 and 2a). The construction of the KHP was
initiated in 2003. Impounding of the reservoir started late September
2006, and the full supply level (FSL) was reached in October 2007
(Fig. 2b).
The Hálslón Reservoir drainage basin is 1800 km2, of which
1400 km2 are covered by Iceland's (and Europe's) largest glacier,
Vatnajökull. The inflow into the reservoir is therefore dominated by the
annual glacial meltwater discharge. The reservoir extends 25 km north
from the glacier area to Mount Kárahnjúkur, where it is retained by
three dams (Fig. 2). The largest dam is the Kárahnjúkar Dam (K Dam), a
198 m high concrete faced rockfill dam (CFRD), built across a narrow
and deep canyon with up to 90 m high canyon walls. A grouting in-
spection gallery is provided in the foundation of this dam with tunnels
on each side of the canyon, interconnected with a passage through a
concreted toewall at the bottom of the canyon. The two saddled dams,
Desjarár Dam (D Dam) and Sauðárdalur Dam (S Dam), are respectively
70 and 25 m high. These are both earth-rockfill dams with a central
core of moraine. A spillway is provided at the northwest bank of the K
Dam and a fuse plug at the southeast end of the D Dam (Fig. 2). The S
Dam is founded on layers of sediments. The foundation of the D Dam
and K Dam is described in the following, along with the geological
settings of the reservoir site.
There are many aspects of this mega engineering project that makes
it interesting and worth reporting, all relating to complex geological
and geophysical conditions, including the unexpected discovery of an
active fault in the foundation of the K-Dam and earthquake clusters
recorded in a nearby active volcanic zone during a subsurface volcanic
intrusion. These complications crystalize in concerns expressed by
geoscientists regarding the KHP in relation to geohazards. Both ap-
prehensions prior to construction that the reservoir might trigger vol-
canic eruption, as well as speculations during the reservoir impounding
on whether the earthquake clusters that were recorded indicating
subsurface magma movement might have been triggered by the im-
pounding. As the authors have not found similar speculations on po-
tential triggering of volcanism due to reservoir impounding in the lit-
erature, they feel obligated to report on this.
In this paper the tectonic and geological setting of the area are
Fig. 1. Location of the Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Plant and the Hálslón re-
servoir.
Fig. 2. The reservoir: (a) Hálslón reservoir and dams, with water on the
spillway. The reservoir is 25 km long. Length of the three dams at crest eleva-
tion is 730 m for the K Dam and 1100 m for both the D and S Dam. (Photo
courtesy of Emil Thor). (b) Reservoir water level in m above sea level since the
start of impounding until March 2019.
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outlined so that the challenges and concerns expressed on geohazards
can be comprehended. Geological investigations and geohazard as-
sessment are described and apprehensions relating to geohazards are
discussed and listed (Table 1). These concerns were widely used in the
public debate to discredit the KHP. Definition is given of what con-
stitutes monitoring of geohazards, followed by an outline of the mon-
itoring networks implemented for the KHP. Furthermore, an important
multidisciplinary approach to the impounding organization is de-
scribed, involving a group of specialists reviewing the monitoring in-
formation. Finally, a summary of results from the geohazard monitoring
is given for the period of multidisciplinary review of the monitoring
data spanning the impounding period and couple of years of reservoir
operation. Results after this period is also reported when relevant for
the apprehensions listed. At every stage the apprehensions listed in
Table 1 are linked to the relevant topic, such as research and in-
vestigations carried out, the monitoring networks, and finally the re-
sults.
The multidisciplinary approach described herein has elements re-
lated to some of the steps of a potential failure mode analysis (PFMA).
Hariri-Ardebili et al. (2016) provide e.g. an example of seismic PFMA
for concrete dams. The concept of PFMA for risk analysis and dam
safety monitoring is respectively described e.g. by USBR and USACE
(2015) and FERC (2017), considering mainly existing dams. USBR and
USACE (2015) explain that a prerequisite for such analysis is a thor-
ough compilation of all relevant background information by all mem-
bers of the team involved. In particular, the interaction of disciplines is
emphasized, as this may reveal vulnerabilities that would otherwise be
missed. FERC (2017) describes how the results of a PFMA can be uti-
lized for a more effective development of surveillance and monitoring
plans, as implemented in the approach described here. However, in
addition to considering dam safety directly, the geophysical and
geoenvironmental impact was also of concern for the current case.
Furthermore, the apprehensions of third parties were deliberated.
Moreover, the multidisciplinary approach discussed demonstrates the
value of a PFMA related methodology, not only for existing dams, but
also during planning and construction of a new mega dam including
observations during the first filling of the reservoir.
Hence, the novelty and significance of the paper lies in the metho-
dology presented on the development and implementation of a multi-
disciplinary organization of a holistic geohazard monitoring in a Mega
Engineering Project (MEP). A comparable multidisciplinary approach
to geohazard monitoring of hazardous infrastructure is difficult to find
in the literature. Hence, reporting on the challenges and settings in-
stigating this multidisciplinary geohazard review, as well as on the
organization of the process and successful outcome is important and of
interest for future infrastructure projects and demonstrates the re-
levance of engineering geology for MEPs.
The purpose of the paper is to promote this important methodology
that relies largely on investigations, analysis and conclusions from en-
gineering geologists. The emphasis is to provide an overview of the
challenges and how these where tackled through first, investigations,
research and analysis providing means to define design/safety limits,
and then monitoring of relevant processes for early warning of potential
undesirable trends. Details of the analysis conducted for each process
are not the topic of this paper, but key results relevant for answering the
listed apprehension are presented.
2. Challenges relating to geohazards
The main geohazard related challenges for the dam design were the
complex geophysical and geological conditions in the larger reservoir
area along with discovery of unknown faults in the dam foundations
during the construction phase. An overview of the geophysical and
geological setting is given in this section, in order to explain the
background for the concerns expressed regarding potential geohazards
during the preparation and construction phases of the project.
2.1. Geophysical and geological setting
Iceland is a volcanic island (Thordarson and Larsen, 2007) strad-
dling the Mid-Atlantic Ridge which marks the boundary of the North-
American Plate and the Eurasian Plate. These plates are continuously
moving apart, resulting in continual intrusion of magma on the
boundary which again leads to tectonic activity. The main volcanic
zones of Iceland (Jóhannesson and Sæmundsson, 1998) (Fig. 3a) follow
the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. These are also referred to as spreading zones.
The spreading of the plate boundary in Iceland is little < 2 cm/yr
(Geirsson et al., 2006, 2010), this can be viewed as the North-American
Plate moving about 1 cm/yr to the north west while the Eurasian Plate
moves 1 cm/yr to the north east (Fig. 3a) (Sigbjörnsson et al., 2018).
The Icelandic crust is relatively thin (10–46 km) (Allen, 2002) and
north of the Vatnajökull glacier the crust is around 10–15 km
(Björnsson, 2008). Post-glacial rebound uplift due to the melting of
Vatnajökull is in the range of 12 mm/yr in the vicinity of the glacier. In
central Iceland the uplift rates are about 25 mm/yr partly attributed to
glacial isostatic adjustment (Völksen et al., 2009). Deformations close
to Vatnajökull ice cap have a peak-to-peak seasonal displacement of
∼16 mm (Grapenthin et al., 2006).
Hálslón and its dams are located outside the main seismic hazard
zones of Iceland, but close to the south east margin of the Northern
Volcanic Zone (NVZ), as shown in Fig. 3. The latest eruptions in the
area east of this margin, including the dam sites, have occurred during
the second last glaciation ~200 kyr ago. The foundations of the K and D
Dams comprises various geological units (Fig. 4), including layers of
basalt lava flows of different origin formed in eruptions during inter-
glacial eras. The foundation is transected by numerous faults, linea-
ments and fissures which will be described in more detail in the fol-
lowing. The most pronounced fault in the foundation of the 198 m high
K Dam (labelled DF-1 in Figs. 4 and 5) was encountered during ex-
cavation in the construction phase. The fault was defined active and is
located where the water pressure due to the reservoir is at its highest.
The geology at the dam sites is described in more detail in Section 3.
The main volcanic systems in the NVZ are shown on Fig. 3b. The
volcanos Kverkfjöll and Askja are closest to the dam site. Also close, but
outside the NVZ, is the currently inactive Snæfell Volcano (i.e. with no
verified eruption of Holocene age). The Kverkfjöll volcano laterally
feeds the eruption of fissures in the south-easternmost part of the NVZ,
called the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm. The volcanic systems and fissure
swarms in Iceland are further explained by Thordarson and Larsen
(2007) and Hjartardóttir et al. (2016).
Five volcanic systems have been identified under the Vatnajökull ice
cap, each containing central volcanoes and fissure swarms. The most
active are the volcanic systems Grıḿsvötn and Bárðarbunga (see
Fig. 3b). A volcanic eruption under the Vatnajökull glacier triggering
glacial outburst flooding into the Hálslón Reservoir is a potential cat-
astrophic event for the Hálslón Reservoir and its dams. The ice and
water drainage basins of the glacier were delineated, and the location
and geometry of subglacial lakes identified (Björnsson, 2003). It was
found that, assuming the meltwater from a subglacial eruption site will
continue to drain through existing conduits, the catchment area of the
Table 1
Geological challenges and/or apprehensions relating to geohazards.
Nr Challenges/apprehensions
A1 Reservoir triggered earthquakes
A2 Excessive leakage
A3 Crustal deformations due to the reservoir may trigger volcanic eruption
A4 Reservoir induced settlements (in meters)
A5 Persistent movements on faults in the dam foundation
A6 Opening of faults in the reservoir and dam foundation
A7 Near field earthquake action of concern for dam structures
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reservoir will most likely not be affected. During the design phase of the
project, glacial outburst flood into the reservoir was thus considered
theoretically possible event, but improbable. However, favoring dam
safety, a fuse plug was provided at the east end of the D Dam to be used
in case of such extreme event.
The earthquakes originating on the spreading zones are relatively
small, with magnitudes that seldom exceed five (Einarsson, 1991 and
2008). The largest earthquakes occur at transform faults and fracture
zones in South and North Iceland (Einarsson, 2008; Wolfe et al., 1997).
This is evident when relating the maps on Fig. 3a and c. The hazard map
on Fig. 3c indicates that the dam site is located in a low hazard area
with peak ground acceleration (PGA) of only 0.02–0.05 g for a mean
return period of 475 years. Still, the design criteria defined considerably
higher PGA as explained in Section 3.
2.2. Apprehensions relating to geohazards
The challenges inherent in the geophysical and geological settings
in the larger reservoir area gave rise for concerns regarding the safety of
the dams holding the reservoir. Apprehensions relating to geohazards
were expressed both prior to and during construction of the dams, as
well as during impounding of the reservoir. The key concerns raised are
listed in Table 1 and discussed in this section.
Following an environmental impact assessment issued in 2001,
concerns were expressed by geoscientists and parties opposing the
project due to its environmental impact, regarding potential geohazard
related risks in the Kárahnjúkar area (referred to also as the Hálslón
Reservoir area after the impounding). In spite of the decision by the
Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources to authorize the
project. Among the apprehensions was that the bedrock in the
Kárahnjúkar area was not well suited as a dam base considering the
fractured characteristics of the crust, indicating unsafe foundation
prone to excessive leakage. Moreover, that crustal deformation due to
fluctuations in the glacial loading and unloading of Vatnajökull Glacier
might cause repeated movements on faults in the dam foundations. A
question was raised whether this in combination with annual cycles in
the reservoir water level could potentially trigger earthquakes (RTE)
and/or affect magma flow and volcanism in the region. It was for in-
stance stated that the reservoir might induce ground settlement mea-
sured in meters.
The debate was intensified by the fact that during the construction
phase, active faults were encountered in the foundations of the K and D
Dam (Figs. 5 and 6). Only a month prior to the reservoir impoundment
concerns regarding the safety of the dams were highlighted in public
debate. This included apprehension concerning potential excessive
leakage and large movements on faults in the dam foundation induced
by water pressure from the reservoir. For instance, a question was
raised regarding how much the fault (DF-1) underneath the K Dam
would open after the impounding. The question was illustrated with a
schematic figure, adopted in Fig. 7.
During the reservoir impounding an episode of earthquake activity
started within the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm in the Northern Volcanic
Fig. 3. Tectonic settings of Iceland. (a) Volcanic spreading zones (grey area). (NVZ, WVZ and EVZ refer respectively to the North-, West- and East- Volcanic Zones;
NAP and EP refer respectively to the North American and Eurasian Plates). (b) Volcanic systems within the Northern Volcanic Zone (NVZ). The boundary of the
Kverkfjöll fissure swarm is shown as defined prior to and after the 2004 re-evaluation. (Location of fissure swarms: Hjartardóttir et al. (2016), tectonics: Jóhannesson
and Sæmundsson (1998), and volcanic systems: from a map from 1987 by Einarsson and Sæmundsson). (c) An earthquake hazard map showing isocontours of
horizontal PGA with a mean return period of 475 years (adapted from Sólnes et al., 2004).
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Zone (NVZ). The largest earthquakes were of magnitude 2.3. More than
9000 tremors were recorded as a part of this activity from February
2007 to April 2008 (Jakobsdóttir et al., 2008). It was stated by geo-
physicists that this episode could potentially be related to the Hálslón
Reservoir impounding and might eventually result in a volcanic erup-
tion. The potential relations of this micro seismicity to the impounding
of the reservoir were therefore deliberated during the impounding
period.
There were different opinions regarding the viability of the above
apprehensions (see Table 1) which were widely used to discredit the
KHP. However, in the interest of dam safety the relevance's of these
Fig. 4. Geological section through the ridge Mount Kárahnjúkur at the site of the Kárahnjúkar (K) and Desjarár (D) Dams (see Fig. 5 for dam location). The dashed red
lines represent the approximate location of the main faults encountered in the foundation of the K Dam during the construction phase. In the foundation of the K Dam
the faults are labelled DF-1 to DF-4. (Based on Gudmundsson and Helgason (2004)). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. The dam site and the reservoir, along with groundwater contour lines
prior to inundation and Holocene faults identified during the construction
phase. The inspection sites pointed out here are further shown in Fig. 8. (Based
on a map made by Landsvirkjun and Iceland GeoSurvey).
Fig. 6. The canyon to be crossed by the K Dam. Excavation of the foundation
revealed the Toe-wall Fault (DF-1), later defined as Holocene strike slip fault
(see also Figs. 5 and 8a). (a) View towards upstream (south), the arrow points to
location of Fig. 6b. (b) View towards downstream (north), the fault is trending
20–25° NNE and considered to be a right-lateral strike slip fault.
Fig. 7. Question on the behaviour of the Toe-wall Fault (DF-1) (see Figs. 5 and
6) in the foundation of the K Dam during impoundment.
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complications were duly considered by the owner, Landsvirkjun (The
National Power Company of Iceland), and investigated. The im-
plemented investigations and research on geohazards are outlined in
the next sections, along with a description of the monitoring scheme
and presentation of key results.
3. Investigations and research on geohazard
Geological investigations of faults and lineaments and ensuing
evaluation of past fault displacements are required to identify and
characterize potential geohazards. The geological findings are essential
for the assessment of seismic hazard, rock fault behavior, groundwater
regime, leakage and more. Furthermore, these aspects need to be con-
sidered when planning a comprehensive monitoring of geohazards. This
chapter introduces how these features were studied for the Kárahnjúkar
Hydropower Project (KHP) since early on in the reconnaissance phase
and describes how new geological findings led to the reevaluation of
geohazards and introduction of an associated monitoring scheme.
Investigations carried out during the progress of the project are sum-
marized in Table 2. The data and information gathered also provided
material in to response to the apprehensions listed in Table 1.
3.1. Reconnaissance and pre-construction phases
Geological investigations for the project were originally initiated in
the late 1970's, followed by more detailed investigations in the dam
area in the 1990's (Stefánsson and Kröyer, 2008), along with a seismic
hazard assessment. Geological Investigations on faults and fractures at
and around the dam sites were conducted on several occasions during
the pre-construction phase. These were somewhat constrained by thick
overburden and difficult site conditions in the canyon to be crossed by
the K Dam. Furthermore, before the construction was approved official
environmental regulations limited the allowable geological studies at
the site, to core drilling and digging of investigative trenches. The early
mapping and study of fissures were thus mostly based on careful log-
ging on exposed rock, core drillings and a 50 m long exploratory tunnel
that was constructed at the left abutment of the K Dam. Consequently,
necessary geological investigations extended into the construction
phase.
Geological investigations during the pre-construction phase did not
reveal any movement in Holocene time on the faults encountered in the
dam area and thus no faults were defined as active. Nevertheless, the
possibility of active faults in the dam area was considered in the ori-
ginal seismic design criteria for the dams. The pre-construction as-
sessment of earthquake action defined a Maximum Credible Earthquake
(MCE) with a PGA of 0.26 g and a potential near-field RTE of short
duration with a PGA of 0.5 g (Sigtryggsdóttir et al., 2012).
Additionally, in response to apprehensions A4 and A3, listed in
Table 1, the effect of the reservoir on crustal movements was studied by
Sigmundsson (2002) resulting in an estimated maximum subsidence of
~30 cm, assuming a crust thickness of 10 km. It was reasoned that this
was unlikely to induce magma movements under the crust, since there
were no known indications of the existence of magma in the upper
crustal layers.
3.2. Construction phase
During the excavation of the foundation of the Kárahnjúkar (K) and
Desjarár (D) Dams a complex fault system was encountered
(Gudmundsson and Helgason, 2004) (see Figs. 4, 5, 6 and 8) . Of special
concern was a fault encountered in the foundation of the K Dam
(Figs. 5, 6 and 7), which was judged to be of strike-slip nature. This
fault, trending N20–22°E, labelled DF-1 is also referred to as the Toe-
wall Fault and has been considered particularly important due its lo-
cation in the canyon directly under the K Dam (see Figs. 4, 5, 6 and 7).
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canyon, south of the K Dam (for location see the arrow pointing to the
ledge on Fig. 5). Sæmundsson and Jóhannesson (2005) inspected the
fault and concluded that a right lateral slip of about 10 cm could pos-
sibly be observed on the fault. Furthermore, that uncemented fill of
3 cm could be taken as representing the amount of possible Holocene
movement.
In the summer of 2004, an escarpment east of Sauðá River (Fig. 5),
termed the Sauðárdalur Fault, was encountered in conjunction with an
investigation on geothermal activity in the reservoir area. This fault was
further investigated and found to be a normal fault with a throw of
about 2.6 m in Holocene time (Gudmundsson and Helgason, 2004). The
throw can be recognized from the soil section in Fig. 8b, which location
is marked and labelled SS in Fig. 5. The earliest recognizable Holocene
movement on this fault, occurred about 9000 years ago and the latest
around 5000 years ago (Sæmundsson and Jóhannesson, 2005). The
length of this fault is 14 km and it is visible as far north as Sauðá River.
New geological findings by Sæmundsson and Jóhannesson (2005)
included a suggestion that this escarpment at Sauðá was an extremity
fault linked to the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm. It was tentatively concluded
that lava last erupted from the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm about 900 years
ago most likely accompanied by activation of faults and ground fissures
which were limited to the central part of the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm. It
was further found that movements on faults, apparently connected to
the formation of this lava did not extend to the easternmost part of the
Kverkfjöll swarm and thus the dam sites. However, an evidence was
found in the dam area for a volcanic episode in Kverkfjöll some
5–6000 year ago, which coincides in time with the last fault movement
in the area as well as with the end of sinter deposition. These findings
by Sæmundsson and Jóhannesson (2005) brought clearer forth the
hazard potential of the Kverkfjöll Volcano and fissure swarm for the
reservoir, by redefining the south-easternmost margin of the Northern
Volcanic Zone (NVZ) further to the east, i.e. closer to the dam sites as
shown on Fig. 3b, which depicts the expected boundaries of the
Kverkfjöll fissure swarm prior to and after the 2004 findings.
A review of geohazards for the Kárahjúkar Hydropower Project was
instigated in early 2005 following the new geological findings in 2004.
The review was conducted by seven specialists on geophysics, seis-
mology and earthquake engineering. The resulting report (Sigmundsson
et al., 2005) presented a brief qualitative review of potential hazard
with limited quantitative assessment of the likelihood of the different
scenarios outlined. Recommendation were however presented re-
garding future research and extended monitoring tasks. Research and
monitoring tasks, in line with the recommendations, were in some cases
already ongoing while others were instigated following the review.
Table 3 provides a summary of the research and monitoring tasks and
relates those to the apprehensions listed in Table 1. However, mon-
itoring alone was found to provide concrete answers to many of the
questions debated at the time. This will be discussed in the next section.
4. Monitoring of geohazards
A geohazard monitoring scheme is of importance for guiding overall
safety and reliability of reservoirs and dams, especially in the case of a
mega dam. Such a scheme should include detection of the general ef-
fects of a reservoir on the geoenvironment. Thus, when developing a
pertinent monitoring scheme, base or reference conditions for the
geoenvironment need to be established by initiating the monitoring
some years prior to construction or reservoir impounding.
The monitoring scheme for the Hálslón Reservoir and Dams was
partly installed during construction but restructured following the
geohazard review by Sigmundsson et al. (2005). The resulting geoha-
zard monitoring scheme is outlined in Fig. 9, and was defined to include
monitoring of seismic activity, crustal and fault movements, leakage
and groundwater levels.
When restructuring the geohazard monitoring, it was recognized
that it should embrace multiple interrelated sources requiring a trans-
parent and organized multidisciplinary approach. To account for this, a
group of earth scientists and engineers was formed to oversee the
monitoring. In this section the organization of the geohazard mon-
itoring scheme is described, including the definition of base conditions
and contribution of the multidisciplinary task force.
4.1. Networks and instrumentation
Instrumentation installed in the Hálslón area aims to monitor
changes in the environment related to geological conditions, which
constitutes monitoring processes related to the geohazards summarized
in Fig. 9. The various monitoring networks and instrumentation were
installed and operated by different institutions by request from the
owner of the Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project (KHP). The monitoring
networks installed are outlined in (i) to (vi) below:
(i) A network of micro seismic stations (Fig. 10) was installed to
monitor seismic activity in the reservoir area as well as in the
nearby volcanic systems, especially the Kverkfjöll Volcano. Fur-
thermore, to identify from micro seismic activity, potential faults
in the reservoir foundation and thereby potential pathways for
leakage.
(ii) Strong motion instrumentation was installed on and near the dams
(see Fig. 11) to monitor their behaviour in the case of an earth-
quake. The standard setup for the dams included a tri-axial ac-
celerometer at the dam crest to monitor structural response and
another in or close to the dam foundations to monitor the incoming
ground motion. The data collected during any observed events can
be used for calibration of numerical structural models as well as to
validate and possibly refine the seismic design of the project.
(iii) For monitoring crustal movements and deformations (Fig. 12),
Fig. 8. Inspection sites in Fig. 5 (arrow and label SS): (a) Holocene strike slip
fault (DF-1, the Toe-wall Fault) on a ledge west of the Jökulsá River, south of
the K Dam. (See arrow to inspection site in Fig. 5). The fault trends N20–22°E.
(Figure courtesy of Kristján Sæmundsson). (b) Holocene fault. Cross section
striking approximately N120oE. Fault displacement relative to tephra marker C
is 2.6 m. (For location see inspection site SS on Fig. 5) (A: Tillite or moraine,
presumably some 10.000 yr. age; B: Fault escarpment, striking N29oE, showing
a downthrow direction; C1, C2. E: Black tephra; D, F, G and I: Different silica
deposits; H: Hard soil with prehistoric tephra layers). (Figure courtesy of Ágúst
Guðmundsson).
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several Continuous Global Positioning System (CGPS) stations
were installed and two networks of benchmarks for Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) surveying campaigns were set up, herein
termed Near Dam Network and Reservoir Network. The two GPS
surveying networks were linked by common observation points.
The purpose is to observe surface deformations of the crust, caused
by the hydrodynamic pressures due to the reservoir filling and
increased overburden weight due to the dams. Furthermore, to
monitor any ongoing other crustal movements, stress accumulation
and/or alteration in the Hálslón area, including potential move-
ment on the Sauðárdalur Fault (Fig. 5) or the faults beneath the
Dams. The Reservoir Network (Fig. 12a) includes 35 benchmarks,
which are distributed over a large area and connect to benchmarks
in nearby volcanic systems. The Near Dam Network (Fig. 12b),
includes benchmarks in the vicinity of the dam sites and was de-
signed to monitor, firstly the impoundment induced deformation
across the K- and D Dams, and secondly, subsidence in the three-
dam area in the northern part of Hálslón.
(iv) Instruments were installed on or near each fault in the foundation
of the K Dam to monitor potential movements, whereas only the
most prominent fault in the foundation of the D Dam is monitored
downstream of the dam. Joint meters and/or crack meters in the
foundation of the K Dam are accessible in the grouting gallery
underneath the main dam. The Toe-wall Fault or fault DF-1 (Figs. 6
and 7) is monitored by extensometers in boreholes crossing the
fault (Fig. 13) but with different alignment in the horizontal plane.
(v) Instruments to monitor groundwater elevation were installed
in > 30 boreholes in the reservoir area (Fig. 14), at dam sites,
Table 3
Monitoring scheme linked to the apprehensions listed in Table 1.
Network/instrumentation Monitoring Providing information for apprehension A#
Micro-seismic monitoring stations in the immediate and larger reservoir area A1 A1, A2, A3, A7
Ground motion and response monitoring systems, on or near the Dams A7 A1, A3, A7
GPS monitoring of crustal movements on the surface in the immediate and larger reservoir area A3, A4 A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7
Joint meters and/or crack meters monitoring of faults in the Dam foundation A5, A6 A2, A5, A6
Groundwater elevation in the immediate and larger reservoir area A1, A2, A6
Leakage observations downstream of the Dams A2 A2, A6
Fig. 9. Geohazard related monitoring.
Fig. 10. Micro seismic stations (triangles) (Operated by the Icelandic
Meteorological Office). The boxed boundary marks earthquake clusters re-
corded in 2007 in the Upptyppingar (blue cluster) and Álftadyngja (magenta
cluster) region, only events ML ≥ 0.8 are included. (Earthquake data provided
by the Icelandic Meteorological Office (Data submission no. 19-02-2016). (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 11. Monitoring systems for strong ground motion and dam response.
(Operated by the Earthquake Engineering Research Centre (EERC), University
of Iceland).
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downstream of dams and along the headrace tunnel. These were
installed to observe general changes in groundwater elevation in
the Hálslón area due to the reservoir filling. The first instruments
were installed in 1998 with boreholes added in 2005 and 2006.
The purpose for the geohazard monitoring was partly to identify
any causal relationship between the groundwater elevation and
potential earthquake activity, as well as to observe any unusual
changes in the observed parameters and potential indication of
increased leakage.
(vi) Monitoring of leakage (or seepage) and its turbidity is one of the
main factors in a comprehensive safety monitoring of a dam. In
terms of geohazards, a sudden increase in leakage might be an
indication of a fault opening in the dam/reservoir foundation.
Whereas increased turbidity might be an indication of erosion or
piping through the dam or its foundation. Leakage is measured at a
weir provided downstream of each dam. Furthermore, flow mea-
surements were conducted at few locations in the canyon
Fig. 12. Benchmarks and CGPS network. (a) The Reservoir Network: Benchmarks (red dots) used in surveying campaigns and CGPS stations (reddish boxes with
labels). The boxed Dam area with the Near Dam Network is shown in Fig. 12b. (b) Near dam CGPS network. (Boxed dam area in Fig. 12a). (GPS benchmark
campaigns and CGPS observations were operated jointly by researchers at the University of Iceland, the Icelandic Meteorological Office and Hnit Consulting
Engineers). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 13. Extension meters crossing the Toe-wall Fault, DF-1, in the foundation
of the Kárahnjúkar Dam (K Dam) where the dam is highest (in the canyon). (a)
Longitudinal view of the K Dam upstream face. (b) Instrumentation in the Toe-
wall. (Dam instrumentation specified by the designer, Kárahnjúkar Engineering
Joint Venture).
Fig. 14. Location of boreholes (JBL) for groundwater measurements. (Network
operated by Landsvirkjun).
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downstream of the K Dam and the D Dam. Additionally, there are
several locations in the tunnel system within the foundation of the
K Dam where leakage is monitored.
In Table 3, the various monitoring networks are linked to the ap-
prehensions and concerns on geohazards previously listed in Table 1.
4.2. Multidisciplinary organization
The general organization chart for the Hálslón Reservoir im-
pounding is shown in Fig. 15. The Steering Committee was responsible
for all actions taken at site during the impounding and was to be in-
formed of all unusual activity in the Hálslón area. Representatives from
both the site supervision (Supervision) and the dam designers (De-
signer) were in the Steering Committee while the chairman of the
committee represented the owner of the project (Owner).
During the impounding period it was also decided, in view of po-
tential geohazards, to involve scientists that were already familiar with
the area and the project through their research and/or on-site operation
of monitoring networks. For this purpose, a multidisciplinary team of
specialists was established, termed the Earth Sciences Group (ESG).
During impounding the ESG was to review monitoring data from geo-
hazard related monitoring networks, submit status reports and provide
consultation on geophysical issues, as well as potential warning pro-
cedures triggered by monitoring data or any observation of abnormal
conditions.
During impounding, daily visual inspection of the dams and sur-
rounding areas were carried out by the Supervision, while the con-
tractors for the dams (Contractors) performed instrumentation readings
(manual and/or automated). Reports from daily visual inspections and
instrumentation readings were updated daily on an ftp site and then
further transferred to the Owner's monitoring website. Monitoring of
groundwater level was mostly automatic and supervised by the Owner's
surveillance team, with the monitoring data assessable through the
monitoring website. Furthermore, interested parties could view seismic
parameters recorded by the micro seismic network and delayed time
series of coordinates from Continuous Global Positioning System
(CGPS) stations on a webpage, where registered activity was docu-
mented.
4.3. The Earth Sciences Group
The members of the earth science group (ESG) were specialists in
one or more of the following fields: geophysics, geology, earthquake
engineering and structural/dam engineering. The members represented
institutions responsible for different instrumentation installed and/or
had conducted site investigations and research in the Hálslón area for
the KHP. In addition, a representative from the Designer was in the
group to ensure focus on issues of relevance for dam safety. The role of
the ESG was to meet regularly during the impounding and review
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monitoring data relating to leakage, groundwater levels, earthquake
activity and crustal movements in the Hálslón area (see Fig. 9). The
objective was to be able to provide consultation regarding geophysical
issues. Furthermore, to report any indications of potential reservoir
triggered earthquakes (RTE) or critical crustal movements.
The ESG was also tasked to define pre-impounding base conditions
in the Hálslón area considering potential geohazards (see Table 4). For
this purpose, the team members were given access to all relevant data.
This included: the seismic design criteria, the impounding manual, the
monitoring and research program, groundwater measurements and
modeling, leakage assessment, risk assessment, and reports on geology,
earthquake hazards, crustal strain and fault movements.
The ESG issued regularly summary reports on the monitoring of
geohazards for the period from start of impounding in September 2006
till the end of the first impounding cycle in December 2007. The last
summary report was finalized in 2009, covering three reservoir filling
cycles. Each summary report was provided as a single sheet table
documenting overall status, supplemented with attachments reporting
on various relevant issues in more detail. The ESG was active during the
impounding and in the following two years after impoundment, while
the cyclic process of impounding and discharging the reservoir was in
progression. The geohazard monitoring systems at the Hálslón
Reservoir and dams are still operated by the relevant institutes, but the
multidisciplinary approach of reviewing the monitoring data is no
longer in effect. This however could easily be revived.
4.4. Base conditions and information levels
Base conditions with regard to geohazard monitoring prior to im-
pounding were defined by the ESG. The base conditions are given in
Table 4, for the instruments monitoring potential earthquakes and
crustal movements in the Hálslón area. Base conditions prior to im-
poundment for groundwater level and movements on faults and linea-
ments in the dam foundation are given in Table 5. These were originally
defined by other consultants but were reviewed by the ESG members.
Two different information levels were defined and are listed in Table 4
along with the base conditions. Information level 1, required a report
on certain events to be sent by email from the party responsible for the
monitoring to the Steering Committee, the Designer and the ESG. In-
formation level 2, additionally required immediate report to the
chairman of the Steering Committee by phone. The cases for which the
review and assessment of the ESG might be requested were listed and
are shown in Table 4 along with the base conditions. For example, an
ESG review might have been requested in the case of sudden increase in
leakage from the reservoir. The potential ESG task would then have
been to assist in identifying and locating the source of the leakage,
potentially along a fault or lineament.
5. Monitoring results
This section reports on the overall results from each monitoring
network leading to the conclusions in Table 6. Table 6 also relates the
monitoring results to the apprehensions previously summarized in
Table 1 and provides the pre-defined design and safety limits for
comparison with the data reported herein. Results from the monitoring
programs hitherto, all indicate that the geophysical impact of the
Hálslón Reservoir is well within the limits set prior to the impounding.
5.1. Seismicity
In the short period of monitoring prior to impounding no earth-
quakes were recorded in the Hálslón area. Conversely, blasting events
were regularly recorded by the seismometric network throughout the
construction period. During impounding, some minor events were de-
tected on the network, mostly defined as frost breaks (icequakes) or
events possibly caused by landslides in the canyon downstream the dam
site. Two or three small events were defined as earthquakes but could
not be related to the reservoir inundation with any certainty. The events
detected by the seismometer network in the Hálslón area during the
reservoir impounding are listed in Table 7. In the years since the start of
impounding no earthquakes related to the reservoir have been reported
to occur in the Hálslón area, although icequakes and a couple of micro-
earthquakes have been recorded. None of the events listed in Table 7
were recorded by the accelerometers installed at the base and crest of
the dams, as the intensity of motion detected by the seismometer sta-
tions was always below the triggering level set for the accelerometer
instrumentation.
Earthquake activity in nearby volcanic systems was reported reg-
ularly during the reservoir impounding. The recordings followed a well-
recognized and familiar pattern until February 2007 when an episode of
earthquake activity started in a previously seismically inactive area
within the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm. The activity started near Mount
Upptyppingar, about 20 km NW of the dam site (see location of events
labelled 2007: 01.01 to 08.31 within the marked boundary in Fig. 10),
migrating with time towards north-east or Mount Álftadalsdyngja
(events labelled 2007:09.01 to 12.31 within the marked boundary in
Fig. 10) and progressing to shallower depth. The activity was described
as concentrated clusters of deep seated (hypo-centric depth of
10–22 km), tectonic earthquakes generally < 2 in magnitude (see
Jakobsdóttir et al. (2008) for details). The largest earthquakes were of
local magnitude ML 2.3. More than 9000 earthquakes were located in
this area from February 2007 to April 2008. In 2007, the year of the
first filling of Hálslón, 5300 earthquakes were detected (Jakobsdóttir
et al., 2008).
The detection of the earthquake activity was made possible by the
installation of the seismic network installed for the project (KHP). It
was thought unlikely or impossible that these tremors could be trig-
gered or influenced by the Hálslón Reservoir considering that such re-
lationship could not be physically explained. On the other hand, it was
pointed out that reactivation of the Kverkfjöll fissure swarm should be
of concern, considering that the Sauðárdalur Fault (Figs. 5 and 8b), in
the Hálslón Reservoir is now linked to that fissure swarm.
Table 5
Monitoring of groundwater, leakage, faults and lineaments. Base conditions and conditions for ESG review.
Instruments Responsiblea Base condition Conditions for ESG reviewb
Ground water level Owner surveillance Base conditions for each borehole defined. Changes in ground-water level indicating increased
leakage or relation to seismicity.
Extensometers on the Toe-wall
fault
Contractor No movements. Changes in monitoring data that might result in increased
leakage or be related to seismicity.Fluctuation in readings typically ± 0,15 mm.
Joint meter on faults Contractor No movement Same as for extensometers.
Crack meters Contractor One reading (zero reading) available prior to impounding.
No movements presumed prior to impounding.
Changes between readings data that might result in
increased leakage.
Leakage Contractor N/A Sudden increase in leakage or turbidity.
a Monitoring during impounding.
b Initiated by the steering committee or the Owner.
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The activity continued in 2007 and when the increase in seismicity
was represented by a cumulative curve of seismic moment, it seemingly
coincided with the water level increase during the then ongoing filling
of Hálslón as shown in Fig. 16 (Roberts et al., 2007; Jonsdottir et al.,
2007). Accordingly, it was stated by some geophysicists that a re-
lationship to the reservoir impounding should not be ruled out without
further monitoring and research. The proposed relationship was de-
scribed as a mystery or it was suggested that magma flow could po-
tentially be caused by even a minor subsidence of the crust due to the
increasing weight of the reservoir, hence triggering these earthquakes.
This hypothetical relationship was doubted within the ESG based on
the following arguments: There was no clear geophysical explanation
for connection between the reservoir and the clusters at Upptyppingar
some 15 km away. Annual crustal deformations due to seasonal change
in the loading from the Vatnajökull glacier are much greater than any
changes in the water level of Hálslón can cause. Potential water in-
filtration between the Hálslón area and the Upptyppingar area was
highly improbable considering orientation of lineaments and the well-
established fact that the two are different catchment areas. Statistical
analysis by independent experts concluded that reservoir triggering of
the earthquakes could not be confirmed. Finally, it was pointed out that
cumulative curves tend to rise, for example in the way shown by
Fig. 16.
The earthquake activity continued into 2008 while the reservoir
elevation decreased, and thus the similarity between the curves in
Fig. 16 was lost, and the discussion expired. Furthermore, in early 2008
after processing data from a surveying campaign to monitor crustal
displacements of benchmark points, the activity (within the marked
boundary in Fig. 10) was explained as a geophysical process unrelated
to the reservoir filling. The micro seismicity recorded had to be inter-
preted in connection with the monitoring of crustal movements to fully
understand the ongoing processes.
During the impounding period, the apprehensions put forward
during the preconstruction phase, were revived and dealt with ration-
ally, in a similar manner. For instance, those concerning reservoir
triggered earthquakes and reservoir induced crustal movements trig-
gering volcanic activity.
Table 6
Limits defined for design/safety and results from monitoring linked to geological challenges/apprehensions listed in Table 1.
Nr. Apprehension/challenges (see Table 1) Defined design and safety limits (see Table 2) Results from monitoring
A1 Reservoir triggered earthquakes (RTE) RTE with PGA of 0.5 g used in seismic design. No RTE measured on monitoring systems
A2 Excessive leakage Design estimate: 5 m3/s Leakage was within design estimates
A3 Crustal deformations due to the
reservoir may trigger volcanic eruption
Considered extremely unlikely. Has not occurred
A4 Reservoir induced settlements (in
meters)
Maximum reservoir induced settlement
estimated to be 300 mm.
Settlement induced by the reservoir (14 ± 10) mm
A5 Movements on faults in the dam
foundation of concern for safety
The design criteria allowed for a 10 cm
maximum differential displacement across
faults.
Reservoir induced movements have been measured near faults in the foundation
of the Kárahnjúkar dam. A maximum potential opening across faults in the range
1 cm, has not led to increased leakage and is not of concern for the dam safety.
Minor temporary opening of DF-2 during the initial impoundment, may have
resulted in an insignificant temporary increase in leakage.
A6 Opening of faults in the reservoir and
dam foundation (Toe-wall fault)
Design criteria allows 10 cm differential
displacement.
Insignificant movement (not confirmed opening) has been recorded on
instruments monitoring the Toe-wall fault.
A7 Near field earthquake action of concern
for dam structures
Predicted earthquake originating on known
faults with a PGA of 0.3 g.
Near field earthquake action of concern for dam safety has not been recorded
hitherto.
Table 7
Seismic events detected by the monitoring system in the Hálslón area during impoundment.
Year
Month
Description of the event detected
2006
Oct A small earthquake of magnitude M~1, was recorded at a depth of 17 km some 7 km ESE of the dam site. Highly unlikely to be related to the impoundment.
Nov Three small shallow events were detected close to Vatnajökull Glacier, west of the reservoir, interpreted to be frost breaks, in accordance with the weather conditions at
the time of occurrence.
2007
Apr Two shallow and small (~M0) events were recorded north of Kárahnjúkar. Possibly caused by a landslide or potentially related to the inundation.
July Two small events (~ M1 or less) of low frequency content and hard to locate, were measured at the Vatnajökull Glacier nearby the Hálslón area. These might be
icequakes.
Sept An earthquake (~M0.7) was recorded about 2 km north of Kárahnjúkar dam at a depth of 0.1 km. Further five events, probably all icequakes, were detected in the ice
catchment of Brúarjökull Glacier.
Nov An event (~M0.5) was recorded close to the Karahnjukar dam at a depth of ~1 km.
Fig. 16. Cumulative seismic moment at Upptyppingar, water level and volume
of the Hálslón Reservoir between Sep 2006 & Nov 2007. (Adapted from a figure
by the Icelandic Meteorological Office, which also provided the earthquake
data).
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5.2. Crustal movements
GPS-campaigns were conducted on the Reservoir Networks
(Figs. 12a and 17) in August of 2005 and 2006 prior to impoundment,
in Sept. 2007 with the reservoir almost full (water level 622 m a.s.l.), in
August 2008 and 2009 (Ófeigsson et al., 2010). In addition to this, three
CGPS stations (see Fig. 12) were installed in 2005, with additional
stations on each side of the Dams installed prior to the impoundment in
2006. They continuously monitored the crustal movements during the
first impoundment cycles and some of them are still in operation.
Prior to the reservoir inundation, in the period 2005–2006, vertical
crustal movements in the Hálslón area were observed from CGPS
monitoring data from stations BRUJ, SAUD and KARV (see location in
Fig. 12a). Firstly, there was an uplift of (15 ± 8) mm/yr related to a
decreasing load on the crust from the nearby Vatnajökull ice cap, and
secondly seasonal variations due to the annual change in snow load.
The average uplift rate close to Hálslón reduced to (2 ± 7) mm/yr in
2006–2007, suggesting an average measured subsidence of (14 ± 10)
mm due to the reservoir filling (Ófeigsson, 2008). These results con-
firmed that apprehension A4 in Table 1, put forth prior to construction
predicting potential large reservoir induced settlements measured in
meters, was not warranted. Furthermore, data from CGPS station HAHV
and KARA/INTA and DIST, installed shortly before impounding on ei-
ther side of the two main dams (for location see Fig. 12b), showed only
very minor vertical movement of the order of a cm, as shown in Fig. 18a
for CGPS station HAHV on the westerly side of the K Dam.
Reservoir induced horizontal movement was detected on CGPS
station KARV (see location on Fig. 12a) during the first month of the
filling amounting to a 6 mm westward movement in January 2007 of
the total 8 mm reported by the end of 2007 when it strangely reversed
its movement to the east. CGPS Stations SAUD and BRUJ (Fig. 12a) on
the other hand did not show horizontal movements until in June 2007
when they showed an increased movement rate to the SSE and SE re-
spectively (see Jakobsdóttir et al. (2008) and Geirsson et al. (2010) for
details). This eastward movement in 2007 was contrary to what could
be expected from the reservoir inundation. Thus, by the end of the first
Fig. 17. Horizontal velocities derived from yearly GPS campaigns on the Reservoir Network between 2005 and 2008 (Ófeigsson et al., 2009). (Courtesy of Benedikt
Ófeigsson).
Fig. 18. Results from selected CGPS stations in the Near Dam Network. (a) Displacement in east, north and vertical direction at CGPS station HAHV west of the K
Dam, sampled at 2 values per week from the start of reservoir impounding. (b) Differential horizontal and vertical displacement between the CGPS stations HAHV on
the west bank and KARA/INTA on the east bank of the K Dam, sampled at 2 values per week.
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filling of the reservoir the CGPS monitoring of horizontal movements in
the larger Hálslón area showed somewhat puzzling movements that
could not by any logical reason be induced by the reservoir. GPS survey
data covering a larger area was required for a more complete picture.
In 2008, the processing of survey data on the Reservoir Network
revealed crustal movement extending from the Upptyppingar-
Álftadalsdyngja area (U-Á area) (see Fig. 17) (Ófeigsson et al., 2009).
Additionally, InSAR (Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar) inter-
ferograms showed a broad inflation extending from the U-Á area into
the Hálslón area. This inflation and the earthquake clusters detected in
the U-Á area in the period between February 2007 and April 2008, have
been interpreted to be due to a magma intrusion beneath Álfta-
dalsdyngja (Hooper et al., 2011; Jakobsdóttir et al., 2008; Martens
et al., 2010; Martens and White, 2013). Hence, the movements ob-
served in the vicinity of Hálslón Reservoir during 2007 were partly due
to the inflation caused by this intrusion. Thus, monitoring the crustal
movements aided in explaining the cause of the micro seismicity in the
U-Á area and showed that this was caused by subsurface magma in-
trusion, but not the reservoir impounding.
The reservoir induced horizontal deformation across the Hálslón
Reservoir upstream of the Kárahnjúkar dam (K-dam) was observed by
GPS campaigns on the Near Dam Network and CGPS observations at
stations KARV, HAHV, KARA/INTA and DIST (Fig. 12b). The measured
deformations suggest widening of the Hálslón canyon with increased
water level during the first reservoir impounding, a trend which may be
intensified by the faults underlying the Hálslón Reservoir and the
foundations of the dams. This effect was for instance noticed at CGPS
Station HAHV, as shown in Fig. 18a, where the benchmark had moved
up to 3 cm towards north and 1.5 cm towards west at the end of the first
impoundment in October 2007. During the impoundment of the re-
servoir, the main orientation of crustal movement was between
southwest and northwest at HAHV and from southeast to northeast at
INTA and DIST, i.e. in all cases more or less across the canyon. Since the
first impoundment the location has been more or less stable except for
the effects of the annual reservoir filling cycle (see Fig. 2b), which is
reflected in the data, especially through the north component. The peak
to peak annual variation is in the order of 1 cm (see Fig. 18a).
The development of differential displacement across the K Dam
canyon in the period September 2006 to January 2012 is shown in
Fig. 18b. The canyon gradually widens during the impounding and
moves towards north under the pressure from the water in the re-
servoir, resulting in a roughly 3 cm total differential displacement be-
tween stations HAHV and KARA/INTA, combining the north and east
components. After the first impounding, no further permanent move-
ment is observed, only seasonal variations. As the longitudinal axis of
the K Dam lies more or less in east-west direction, the east component
gives the best estimate of the actual widening of the canyon and thereby
possible opening of faults. It is observed in Fig. 18b, that the east-west
differential displacement across the K dam is roughly 2 cm after the first
impounding and no permanent increase is observed since. A further
east-west differential movement of about 1 cm was observed across the
D Dam from early June 2007.
5.3. Fault movement
During and after the impounding, insignificant or minor movement
has been detected on instruments monitoring fault movement. The
deformation recorded since start of impounding in 2006 to 2009, along
the two extensometers crossing the Toe-wall Fault, DF-1 (Fig. 13), is
insignificant or < 0.3 mm on each (see Fig. 19). The extensometer EX2
measures subtraction while the EX1 measures extension, considering
the alignment of the extensometers this indicates either vertical dif-
ferential displacement and/or horizontal sliding. However, the move-
ment is insignificant, and the measurements may be influenced by
movement of the Toe-wall itself. The insignificant movement is con-
firmed by other deformation measurements in the Toe-wall. However,
there have been movements detected near faults labelled DF-2 and DF-3
in the K Dam foundation. The movement observed near fault DF-2 oc-
curred in 2016 and was an opening in the order of 1 mm which coin-
cided with a sudden increase in water pore pressure. The water pressure
was relieved after the measured fault opening and dropped con-
siderably or to a level monitored in 2008. No external trigger could be
identified. Some temporary minor increase in leakage was noted fol-
lowing this movement of fault DF-2. The largest persistent movement is
detected near fault DF-3, or an expansion in the order of 10 mm. The
expansion is measured manually on a simple standard concrete crack
monitor installed on a movement joint in the grouting gallery near the
fault. The movement follows, with a slight delay, the measured
groundwater level at the fault location, which in turn follows the re-
servoir level as can be seen on Fig. 20. A slight decrease in the response
with time can be noted for both the groundwater pressure downstream
(GW-D) as well as the measured expansion. The groundwater pressure
measured at the fault location (see Fig. 20) is further discussed below.
The measured movement is within design limits, but the dam design
allows for up to 100 mm expansion on individual faults and movement
joints within the structure.
Monitoring of the most profound fault in the foundation of the
Fig. 19. Monitoring of fault DF-1 (the Toe-wall Fault), with extensometers (see
Fig. 13) EX1 and EX2 (original data filtered with a moving average filter with a
span of 5%). Negative and positive values respectively indicate tension and
contraction.
Fig. 20. Measured expansion of movement joint in the grouting gallery of the K
Dam near fault DF-3 (see Fig. 4) plotted with groundwater level measured at the
fault location, as well as the reservoir water level.
The groundwater pressure is measured at the Fault DF-3 (GW-F), as well as
upstream (GW-US) and downstream (GW-DS) the grout curtain at the DF-3
location (see Fig. 4).
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Desjarár dam implies subtraction but the movement is insignificant.
The results from monitoring the faults in the dam foundation pro-
vide direct answers to apprehensions A5 and A6 listed in Table 1.
Confirming that the fault movements are insignificant and hitherto not
of concern for dam safety.
5.4. Groundwater and leakage
Groundwater elevation has been monitored in numerous boreholes
around Hálslón Reservoir, since 1998. The groundwater table prior to
impounding was drawn from these measurements and is shown in
Figs. 5 and 7. During and after impounding, the monitoring revealed
that the reservoir elevation in general only affects the groundwater
table where the water level rises above the groundwater elevation as it
was prior to impounding. For instance, at the reservoir banks, where
the groundwater table is lower than the annual variation in the re-
servoir elevation, the monitoring data follows the reservoir water level
(Axelsson, 2013). Hence, no unexpected changes have been observed
from the monitoring data. The reservoir elevation governs the
groundwater table in the dam foundation as well as at the reservoir
bank. Precipitation (see Fig. 21) does not directly influence the
groundwater table in the dam foundation, since this accumulates into
the reservoir above the measuring location. In general, the effect of
precipitation on the groundwater table at the reservoir banks is negli-
gible and insignificant for the geohazards considered here in compar-
ison with the inflow of glacial melt water into the reservoir.
Fig. 20 displays groundwater pressure measured at the fault DF-3,
presented as groundwater level. The figure is presented both as an ex-
ample of the variation in the groundwater level with the reservoir water
level (RWL) and to demonstrate this relation at a fault location. The
groundwater level is measured by piezometers located upstream (de-
noted GW-US on Fig. 20) and downstream (denoted GW-DS on Fig. 20)
the grout curtain at the fault location, as well as within the fault DF-3
(denoted GW-F on Fig. 20). The groundwater level upstream the grout
curtain is nearly identical to the reservoir water level, although the
peak response has slightly reduced with time. Furthermore, there is a
head drop across the fault (GW-F) from the upstream (GW-US) to the
downstream (GW-DS). The response to the reservoir elevation mea-
sured by the piezometers has reduced with time, indicating self-sealing
of the foundation from the high sediment content of the water in the
reservoir, which is fed by glacial rivers. The reduction is strongest for
the downstream piezometer (GW-DS). Similarly, the movement mea-
sured in the grouting gallery (see expansion in Fig. 20) has decreased.
Measured leakage has been in the order of about 200 l/s at the
downstream toe of the Kárahnjúkar (K) dam (see Fig. 21) and roughly
50 l/s downstream the two saddle dams, respectively. The leakage
follows the reservoir elevation as evident from Fig. 21 showing mea-
surements downstream of the toe of the K dam, along with the reservoir
level and daily precipitation. The daily precipitation for the period
shown is on the average 1.24 mm with a standard deviation of ± 2.58
mm, with occasional peak values between 20 and 30 mm. The daily
precipitation has insignificant influence on the overall leakage mea-
surements. The gaps in the leakage data observed from the figure are
mainly due to difficult instrument operational conditions during per-
iods of reservoir spilling. The leakage at the highest reservoir elevations
is seen to gradually decrease with time, again indicating self-sealing of
the dam foundation as mentioned above. The total leakage further
downstream the reservoir is difficult to measure but is estimated based
on available measurements to be less than the 5 m3/s predicted prior to
impounding. Additionally, turbidity is measured in the reservoir and
the seepage water, and no unexpected changes or trends can be noted
from the monitoring data.
The time-series of both leakage and turbidity data, show a pattern of
response to the reservoir elevation in line with the behavior shown in
Fig. 21. However, no long-lasting trends have been observed indicating
undesirable processes ongoing in the dams or their foundation, such as
erosion or gradually increasing opening of lineaments. In conclusion,
the leakage is well within acceptable limits. Thus, the leakage mea-
surement provided answer to the question inherent in apprehension A2
in Table 1, on leakage.
6. Discussion
Establishing a group of specialists, the Earth Science Group (ESG),
as a part of the Hálslón impounding organization, turned out to be an
effective venue for discussing and debating the potential geohazards in
the area. Such a multidisciplinary approach is highly recommended for
mega projects facing geohazard related challenges as well as those
where potential effects on the geoenvironment are being disputed. The
discussions within the ESG took place mostly parallel to the process of
construction and impounding and did not interrupt the operations on-
going at the construction site. However, representatives from both the
Designer and the Owner, along with a special panel of three interna-
tional experts appointed for the project, were well informed and took
part in the discussions on monitoring issues, interpretation of geoha-
zards and the potential threats facing the dams and the reservoir. Even
though consensus might not have been reached on all aspects, con-
structive discussion raised the level of knowledge on the subjects at
hand as well as awareness regarding the various topics addressed.
The approach taken in the design of the geohazard monitoring as
well as the multidisciplinary methodology described has, e.g. through
identification of the apprehensions in Table 1, elements that are com-
patible with a potential failure mode analysis (PFMA) (see e.g. Hariri-
Ardebili et al. (2016), FERC (2017) and a joint publication by USBR and
USACE (2015), and). Comprehensive implementation of a PFMA in a
project facing geological challenges advances the approach described in
this paper. This would set a clearer focus for any multidisciplinary
group of specialists when reviewing relevant background information
as those made available to the ESG (see Section 4.3), as well as in the
analysis and review of the monitoring data. A systematic identification
of potential failure modes combined with the methodology described
by Sigtryggsdóttir et al. (2016), should enhance the design of the
monitoring systems as well as aid in defining alarm values and/or
alarming trends in the collected data. This should further assist in
identifying potential interrelation between data from different pro-
cesses. Thus, there are clear benefits in the use of a PFMA, while the
limitations are related to the quality and extent of data and information
available, as well as the knowledge and experience of the specialists
performing the analysis.
The case study presented, demonstrates that complications due to
Fig. 21. Leakage measured at the downstream toe of the K dam plotted as a
function of time along with the seasonal variations in the reservoir water level
and daily precipitation (precip.) (Precipitation data is from a weather station in
the area operated by the Icelandic Meteorological Office).
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geohazards related to tectonics can arise even in an area generally as-
sessed as a low seismic area. Important for the Kárahnjúkar
Hydropower Project (KHP) in this respect was the conservative design
criteria developed during the pre-construction phase considering a
maximum credible earthquake (MCE) event in the approximate dam
area as well as a reservoir triggered earthquake (RTE). Consequently,
the reevaluation of the earthquake action had insignificant effects on
the dam design. When pre-construction geological investigations are
constrained environmentally or limited by difficult access it is generally
sensible to make conservative design assumptions to account for un-
expected geological findings. In this respect it should be noted that for
dam design it is recommended to consider a MCE, event originating on
a recognized fault in the reservoir area or within a geographically de-
fined tectonic province (ICOLD, 2016). Thus, favoring safety, one may
apply an improbable earthquake that does not necessarily comply with
the general seismic hazard zoning of the site area.
In ICOLD bulletin no 148 (ICOLD, 2016) it is recommended that a
regional geological study area should cover as a minimum a 100 km
radius around the dam site. This case study brings forth the relevance of
this recommendations. While reconnaissance geological mapping for
the KHP covered a large area, geological investigations of faults and
lineaments during the pre-construction phase mostly focused on the
construction area of the dams. Hence the Sauðárdalur Fault (Figs. 5 and
8b) was not recognized as active fault until additional geological in-
vestigations were instigated during the construction phase.
One of the lessons learnt from the KHP is that when conducting
geohazard assessment it is of key importance to distinguish between
scenarios that are considered possible and those that are probable.
Invaluable for this purpose is the scientific work conducted, either in
the field obtaining information relevant for further analysis and as-
sessment, or analytically using numerical analysis and simulation
leading to quantitative information that can be applied in design and
used for reassessment of safety and risk. The scenarios deemed probable
need to be assessed and their effect on dams and overall reliability
analyzed. However, additional scenarios that may be possible, although
improbable, still need to be considered within reasonable limits as is,
for example recommended by ICOLD regarding the definition of a MCE
event (ICOLD, 2016). It is important in this respect to recognize that a
systematic monitoring of the relevant processes can involve both
probable and improbable scenarios.
7. Concluding summary
The results from the monitoring programs, discussed and shown in
Section 5, all indicate that hitherto the geophysical impact of the Hál-
slón Reservoir, the main reservoir of the Kárahnjúkar Hydropower
Project (KHP), is well within the limits given in Table 6, which were set
prior to the impounding. Only few micro earthquakes have been de-
tected in the Hálslón area and none can be associated with the in-
undation. Furthermore, the seismicity of the area has not been altered
by the reservoir. During the impounding, movement of magma within
an active volcanic zone was detected by earthquake clusters 20 km N-W
of the reservoir. These clusters were allegedly linked to the reservoir
impoundment to begin with, but later found to be due to magma in-
trusion in the area (Jakobsdóttir et al., 2008; Martens and White, 2013)
with a crustal inflation extending into the Hálslón Reservoir area. The
inflation was detected by instruments monitoring crustal movements,
set up as part of the geohazard monitoring systems related to the KHP.
Thus, monitoring crustal movement was important in explaining this
unusual micro seismic activity and in confirming that it was not trig-
gered by the reservoir. The observed crustal movements in the reservoir
area are less than predicted before the start of impounding. The average
subsidence of the dam area was measured to be in the order of 1 to 2 cm
due to the reservoir filling (Ófeigsson, 2008) compared to a numerical
estimate of 30 cm and speculative apprehensions suggesting meters (see
A4 in Table 1). Displacements across lineaments and faults in the dam
foundations are well within design limits and correspond well with
numerical estimation (Snæbjörnsson et al., 2006). The largest fault
opening measured is within 10 mm compared to the 100 mm allowed
for in the design. However, the movement measured on the Toe-wall
Fault (DF-1) in the canyon crossed by the mega dam, Kárahnjúkar CFRD
(K dam) is insignificant. Finally, changes in the groundwater level are
as expected and leakage is well within acceptable limits.
In the process of defining a suitable geohazard monitoring for future
mega projects facing geological challenges, a potential failure mode
analysis in combination with the systematic methodology presented by
Sigtryggsdóttir et al. (2016) comprising a reusable template, is highly
recommended. Furthermore, an organization of the geohazard mon-
itoring with the involvement of an Earth Science Group, as for the case
presented here, is further recommended in the implementation and
operation of the geohazard monitoring system. Moreover, it is im-
portant for every project involving reservoirs and dams, to have ap-
prehensions regarding potential geohazard expressed and questions
raised by experts and the public alike. It is equally important to provide
answers to those questions either by numerical assessment or mon-
itoring of relevant features. Some of the concerns raised on potential
geohazards for the KHP can be considered unwarranted, but others
were certainly relevant. In any case, the concerns raised were a positive
driving force for a careful review of geohazards and other available
information. Furthermore, this influenced the decision to establish a
multidisciplinary monitoring program focusing on potential geohazards
in a more holistic manner than perhaps would have been realized
otherwise.
The monitoring of geohazards for Hálslón, the KHP main reservoir,
has indeed answered the most urgent questions and concerns raised
prior to and during impounding. The case study presented, thus de-
monstrates that a monitoring program set up to guard safety and re-
liability may also be important to provide required information on
geoenvironmental impact not only for scientific interest but also for
public information.
Today (in the year 2019) the monitoring systems are still in op-
eration. However, it is of concern to the authors that a systematic re-
view of the data is no longer in effect. It is a common situation, that a
normal operation, in this case for over a decade, may give the sensation
of stable conditions and safe structures. Consequently, less attention is
given to both the monitoring of geohazards and data analysis as time
passes. Therefore, a potential alarm for hazardous events, inherent in
the monitoring data, may not be recognized.
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